The Research On Auditing Collusion Governance Oriented By Balanced Interest Of Audit Relationship Parties

The complexity of realistic audit environment leads to the distortion phenomena of audit relationship. So the legitimate interest of audit relationship parties can't be completely protected, then audit collusion happened, which deteriorates the imbalance of audit relationship. The reason of why audit collusion is so difficult to be solved is that the interest of audit relationship parties can't be distributed fairly or legally, the power and responsibility are not transparent. Audit collusion is a world-widely difficult problem. So it is meaningful to research on audit collusion governance.The study is based on the theories of imbalanced information theory,limited government theory,audit collusion accrete theory, the juristic protection of investors theory and so on. First of all, we redefined the category of audit relationship parties, replaced the traditional audit receiver with prospective audit report users, and defined the audit collusion interest relationship bodies, which contains auditors,managers,prospective audit report users and the government. We think the government should be responsible for its policy mistakes and non-effective supervision when accounting cheat and audit collusion exist seriously. Secondly, with the consideration of our country's situation, we deeply analyzed the reasons and mechanism of audit collusion, we also used a game model and a case to analyze it. We think the management authorities of listed company should have greater responsibility for audit collusion and the loss of the investors, and prospective audit report users have the right to gain real information and be compensated limitedly. Finally, through the analysis of balanced interest, we point the leading idea of audit collusion is as follows: the management authorities of listed company and auditors must restrict themselves effectively,auditor receiver supervision effectively,government supervision effectively and investors trust effectively. We also put forward the three-dimensional governance viewpoint, which contains motivation correction,process control,the result supervision and punishment.