The Research Of Credit Information Sharing And Penalizing System Of Discreditable Behavior Based On Capital Of Creditworthiness

Bank credit market is a typical one with asymmetric information, which will lead to"moral hazard"and"adverse selection". In such a market, the price—interest rate would not clear the market, and credit rationing will happen, which would limit the size of the market and decrease its efficiency. Early in the last 70's and 80's, these phenomenon and problems were studied by many foreign researchers and related theories have already matured. Since last 90's, more and more researchers have focused on the asymmetric information problem solving, that is by means of credit information sharing system and penalizing system of discreditable behavior.The paper analyzes the credit information sharing system and penalizing system of discreditable behavior, and tries to describe the roles played by the two mechanisms. In our analysis, we establish a one-period loan model and take it as the framework of the credit market, and then we give the concept of capital of creditworthiness. From the perspective of capital of creditworthiness, we extend the one-term loan model to the infinite-period model in a framework which combines the credit information sharing and credit penalty, especially interest rate penalty. From the analysis, we can see clearly that credit information sharing and credit penalty could enlarge the size of the credit market and encourage the repayment of bank loans. Such conclusions coincide with the empirical findings.Finally, basing on these conclusions, the paper suggests that China should establish a credit information sharing system involving credit penalty and encouragement system. Such a framework is also a theoretic explanation for China's current credit system construction.