The Research Of Fund Management Fees Based On The Principal-agent Theory

The question of China's fund management fees seems in recent years particularly outstanding.For example,according to Tianxiang Data statistic,by 30^th June,2008,59 fund companies' counting and drawing management fees reach together up to 18.8 billion yuan in the first half of the year,an increase of nearly 1.2-fold compared with the corresponding period.The fund loss of the first half of the year amounts to 1080 billion, reaching the loss record level compared to the same time in history.It can clearly be seen that the fund managers as agents are not willing to share both risk and profit with fund owners,so the fund management costs can not incarnate the compensable factor well in practice.This article,from the theory of agency,analysizes systematically the advantages and disadvantages of the counting and drawing methods of China's current fund management cost;and analysize empirically the stimulating effects in terms of Panel Data model.On the above-mentioned research base,this article designs the counting and drawing methods of China's fund management fees in terms of mechanism design theory in order to strength the stimulating role and reduce the agent risk.This article first analysizes the counting-drawing methods and historical development of USA and China,compares the differences and similarities of the counting and drawing methods of the two countries.On this base,it also analysizes the shortcomings of the counting and drawing methods of China's current fixed fee rate.The theory of agency argues that suitable management fee design will stimulate the fund managers to make efforts for the maximizing benefits of them and fund investors. This article designs 3 fund management counting-drawing methods:absolute performance motivation,relative performance motivation and differential returns+ absolute performance+relative performance;and compare them with each other.As a result,when the fund investors know more information of fund managers,they can gain more profits.The relative motivation and differential returns+absolute performance+ relative performance methods are superior to the absolute motivation.This article,in terms of the empirical research of Panel Data model,discovers that China's current fund management fee counting-drawing methods can not incarnate the compensable factor well in practice.The main empirical research results are as following:the fund management fees of the last period and the net growth rate of current period are irrevelant;the current fund management fee+current fund trustee fee +current net fund growth rate are positive relationship;the influence of open-ended fund management to fund growth rate is smaller to that of close-ended fund.This article,through its research,can be used for reference in the mechanism design of fund management fee counting-drawing methods.