Research On The Efficiency Of The Housing Accumulation Fund System Based On The Principal-agency Theory

Housing accumulation fund system is an important measure of the housing system reform in China. It concentrates efforts of country, organization and individual to ease the housing problems, not only reduce the heavy burdens that country and organization should build distribute houses, improve people's housing conditions, but also lead people to the era of housing monetization. In nearly 20 years of development, this system has been popularized nationwide. It has been accumulated more than two trillions to date, but the dilemma and challenges appear more and more.In this paper, it summarizes the existing problems based on the development, character and basic operation of housing accumulation fund, mainly including three aspects: deposit subject, administrative institution and related organizations, which analyze the conflict between operation and original establishing on the view of organization and human being. Compared to development of overseas financial security system of housing and changes of related system, it's necessary to change the housing accumulation fund system from the standpoint of management.Based on the principal-agency theory which is one part of the new institutional economics, this paper attempts to research the adverse selection and moral hazard problems between contract parties under the paradigm of the housing accumulation fund contract, which introduce Professor Laffont's motivation design and hypothesis of human's opportunism and bounded rationality into the research of housing accumulation fund system deeply. In the condition of information asymmetry, it explores the impact parameters of suboptimum contract under the motivation design in the housing accumulation fund system , in order to analyze the reasons of low efficiency concretely in the housing accumulation fund system and provide suggestions of improving the housing accumulation fund system.