Research On Relationship Between Balance Mechanism Of Shareholding And Private Value Of Corporate Control In Chinese Listed Companies

In recent years, the focus of corporate governance has shifted to the conflict of interests between the major shareholders and small shareholders. Agent problems between large shareholders and small shareholders are becoming increasingly hot corporate governance research, replacing that between shareholders and managers. According to the information asymmetry theory, major shareholders have the motivation to against the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders and obtain earnings by using control. In Chinese listed companies, because of the existence of special ownership structure which dominance by a single shareholder, it is more general about that. Studying the major shareholders how to against the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders and how to restraint of that is great significant.In this paper, at first, the author combined the literature at home and abroad systematically and discussed the related theories in detail, such as equity theory of checks and balances. At the basis of that, this paper discussed the relationship between balance mechanism of shareholding and private value of corporate control. And then test the relationship between the two by empirical analysis. At last, we put some forward proposals according to the test results. In this paper, we consider that setting up share structure of checks and balances in companies can be bound to some extent on major shareholders against the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders, safeguarding the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders and ensuring healthy and stable development of the securities market.