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Study On The Investment Strategic Decision Of New Products Development Based On The Option-Game Theory

Posted on:2010-08-05Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J Z HeFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360275474687Subject:Business management
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For the contemporary company, the innovation of new product has been an important work for the business application. Accordingly, as an economical decision, it becomes more and more urgent how to judge the innovation of new product decision full-scale correctly, objectively in the management practice. The traditional judgment methods supply a quantified basis. However, in the real life, the company usually faces the risk in the operation. And the decision which the company makes contains more and more risk. So the traditional evaluating methods can not reflect the flexible value in the innovation decision. They can't analyze and evaluate the innovation value of new product correctly. The real option method considers the value of the decision flexibility,but it does not consider the reactive of input decision and ignore reactions of competitors. So the real option can not appraise the decision of new product innovation. The judgment for the investment program based on option game theory and method, not only consider the decision flexible value, but also caring the influence of the competition between the participant, compensating the traditional methods defect and making the judgment of program value more subjectively and correctively.In the first place,this paper analyzes the traditional methods of investment value and prominently interpret the theory of option games. In the second place, according the feature of the new product innovation, this graduation dissertation constructs a new option game model which conclude the instead modulus between the products in the uncertain condition. And then this dissertation analyzes the strategy equilibriums of the symmetric and asymmetric duopoly options game model. The research implies that investment threshold of the competition participant increases following a fluctuating seriously market. That is to say, the market risk impairs the company's investment activity. In the last place, this article analyzes the influence of the instead modulus between product to the cost of pre-investment by Computer Simulation. The paper discovers that the cost of pre-investment has a monotonic increasing tendency in the un-simultaneous equilibriums following the instead modulus decreasing. However, the cost of pre-investment has an un-monotonic increasing tendency in the simultaneous equilibriums following the instead modulus decreasing.
Keywords/Search Tags:products innovation, option games, symmetric duopoly, asymmetric duopoly, investment equilibrium
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