Strategy Research Of Cooperative R&D Of Asymmetric Duopoly With Endogenous Spillovers

Cooperative R&D is an important branch of modern Industrial Organization Theory. As thedevelopment of economics, technical innovation is more and more important in the competitionbetween enterprises. However, it is hard to solve the problems which accompany with technicalresearch, such as amount of funding, long cycle, uncertainty of new technology, and so on.Cooperative R&D is the best solution for these problems at present. It could realize thecommunication of technology, knowledge, and talents between enterprises. Cooperation is agood way to decrease the cost, increase the efficiency, and ease the uncertainty risk of R&D.Meanwhile, cooperative R&D can avoid excessive competition and duplication of research.Nonetheless, it is hard to avoid moral hazard and protect the stability of cooperation because ofthe asymmetric information.To solve this problem, based on the shortages of presented researches, this paper builds athree-stage game model with endogenous spillovers, non-homogenous products and asymmetriccosts. And this research includes the situations of perfect and imperfect information. To bespecific, with perfect information, this paper analyses the best choices of enterprises, theinfluences of production substitutions and cost differentiations on social welfare. And withimperfect information, based on stand-alone test, this paper analyses the problem of moralhazard and adverse selection for cooperators, and discusses the stability of cooperation bynumerical simulation.The results shows that cooperation, both in the decisions of R&D input and technicalspillovers, is the only way to realize the Pareto Optimality with perfect information. Under theimperfect information, enterprises are hard to realize cooperation without institutional constraint,but it does not mean impossible. Within the possibility boundary, enterprises could cooperatespontaneously, even though it is a hard bargain.