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Study Of Multi-task Incentive Contract In Service Outsourcing--The Incentive Contracts Design Of Logistics Outsourcing

Posted on:2010-06-22Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:T ZhouFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360275482212Subject:Industrial Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Service outsourcing is a new transaction style in the 21th century. To this new transaction style, many companies are very long for but fear of out of control and leading to huge production risk. Service outsourcing has new trading products, new ways of trading, the new transaction risk. These characteristics can easily lead to same results:unmeasured products, information asymmetry, moral hazard and increaseing cost of supervision. These phenomenon are generated a problem finally, how to monitor outsourcing agent? Response to these emerging issues, how to solve these problems in service outsourcing is the bottleneck in research. Based on the traditional principal—agent theory, this paper use theory of motivation in management in order to find a solutions for incentive problems in service outsourcing.This study briefly introduced and analysised the main theory at first, meantime verified its applicability to this study. And then analyzed the dynamic analysis in service outsourcing based on outsourcer perspective to extract the essence of service outsourcing and variables. After two preparing studies mentioned above, this paper have built incentive model with the characteristics of service outsourcing firstly, and get the general solution of incentive model. Then, in accordance with an important feature of service outsourcing—multi-task, this paper have built a multi-task incentive contract to address the issue of common anti-back of interest.In the fourth chapter, this paper applied above two theoretical models to business background as the positive analysis of this model. In logistics services outsourcing,it have not only the characteristic of multi-task, but also there are a larger differences between these tasks in nature. According to these characteristics which reflects the logistics services outsourcing,this paper built a model to measure the relationship between the incentive coefficient and measuring complexity,and then increased the content of the model to make it more suitable for multi-tasks logistics service outsourcing. According to the new development in the relationship of logistics services buyers and sellers, this paper analysis of this phenomenon and put forward a set of implicit contract model of logistics services outsourcing.Finally, this paper summarized the researching results and proposed future direction for further research.
Keywords/Search Tags:Incentive Contract, Principal-Agent Theory, Service Outsourcing, Logistics, Moral Hazard
PDF Full Text Request
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