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The Research Of Outsourcing Incentive Contract Under Principal-agent

Posted on:2007-08-09Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360185992929Subject:Management Science and Engineering
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Outsourcing can enable enterprises to concentrate the limited resources and competences on their own core business, in order to create and maintain long-term core competence. Therefore, the domestic and foreign enterprises apply outsourcing widely because of its unique advantage to enterprises, and improve the method of outsourcing constantly. Though the outsourcing has such advantages, the enterprises have to face asymmetric information after outsourcing, which lead to the failure of many outsourcing operations. How to achieve the succession of outsourcing has been the goal which domestic and foreign scholars and enterprises are looking for.The dissertation introduces the principal-agent and incentive contract and analyzes the moral hazard under asymmetric information of principal-agent.Through the analysis of principal-agent with parameters model, the dissertation introduces a single-index contract model and improves on the incentive contract of outsourcing. And the dissertation puts forward a multi-index contract model from the customer satisfaction and the short-term profit of enterprises, and provides an optimal incentive contract which balances the short-term profit and long-term goals. In this way, the enterprises have a new method to solve the moral hazard in outsourcing.At last, the dissertation analyzes the outsourcing of ATM maintenance. Through the customer satisfaction survey, the dissertation uses SPSS 13.0 to make a foundation statistical analysis, figures the multi-index model preliminarily, and gives...
Keywords/Search Tags:outsourcing, principal-agent, incentive contract, moral hazard, customer satisfaction
PDF Full Text Request
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