Research On Online Complementary Heterogeneous Multi-Object Auction Mechanism Design And Application

Online auction is not limited to works of art and collections with difficultly fixed price in traditional auction, and is widely used in general consumer goods. For daily consumer goods, the quantity of goods used in exchanging may be relatively large, online auction mechanism should therefore have the quality of multi-object, these items can be completely homogeneous, can be the same or similar, and also may be homogeneous relativity (usually divided into alternative or complementary relationship).The nature of items is vital to the design of the auction mechanism, and the choice of online auction mechanism has an important practical significance. However, the existing theories of online optimal auction design are only applicable to homogeneous items or two kinds of heterogeneous items, so explore homogeneous relativity, especially online three kinds of complementary heterogeneous multi-object auction mechanism has very important theoretical value and practical significance.This thesis first defines the mathematical expression for complementary and effective delineation into a collection of items. Based on a great deal of access to literature at home and abroad , and make a comparative analysis of online auction theory and traditional auction theory to find out the difference and contact of them, according to the need, and make some reasonable assumptions for some of these parameters, including the auction site belongs to the vendue master, so the transaction costs are zero; the optimal reserve price is usually set at the lowest allowable level by the vendue master, and it can be similar to that of zero; the end rule of auction is the fixed-time rule; the items on online are not usually dear, so the costs should be taken into account ; bidder arrival process obey the Poisson distribution. Finally, according to mechanism design theory, the revelation principle and the envelope principle, on the basis of the basic model, combined with previous assumptions, make a reasonable research, and establish online three kinds of complementary auction heterogeneous multi-object auction mechanism model, and verify some specific application scenarios on this basis.In this thesis, reach the following conclusions and research results.First of all, sum up the present situation of theory research, experiments research and empirical research in multi-object online auction mechanism. Secondly, models basic online complementary heterogeneous multi-object auction mechanism, in order to draw valuable conclusions, the quantity of goods is set to 3, and gets the optimal distribution rules and payment rules for online three kinds of complementary heterogeneous multi-object auction mechanism, theoretically ensures the vendee can get the greatest expected revenue, and for the winning bidders of the auction, their payment should not be more than the expected revenue they make when they report the lowest type of preferences.Thirdly, verify some specific application scenarios on online three kinds of complementary heterogeneous multi-object synchronization auction mechanism model basis, including the bidders are symmetrical, the bidders'valuation of the combination of the items is zero, the bidders have linear valuation function and the bidders'valuation subjects to [1,2] uniform distribution, and reach the following conclusions: (1)when the bidders are symmetrical, the vendue master allocating three kinds of items to the bidder with the highest preference type at the same time is optimal; (2) when the bidders'valuation of the combination of the items is zero, the optimal auction simplifies three independent optimization problems, such a case the optimal auction is to make single-object optimal auction independently for three kinds of items; (3)when the bidder has linear valuation function, the vendue master makes the maximum expected profit as the cases may be; (4) the bidders'valuation subjects to [1,2] uniform distribution, the vendue master allocating three kinds of items to the bidder with the highest preference type at the same time is also optimal.