Fiscal Game Mode Analysis Between The Central And Local Governments In China

The relationship between central and local governments is vital to a country, which directly relates to the unification of nation,the stability of politics and the development of economy.The essence of the relationship between central and local governments is the one of different interests,namely the interest relationship between the whole nation and the local parts,which is a pair of contradiction.Combined with the Game theory and models,this thesis is studied on fiscal relationship between central and local governments.Firstly,it reviews the historical development of the fiscal relationship between central and local governments after the foundation of China,and analyzes the evolution of fiscal centralization and decentralization of the country.Secondly,detailed analysis and explanation will be made on the fiscal revenue distribution and transfer payment system combining the game models and the reality of our country.Finally,the causes will be found and suggestion of how to equilibrate the fiscal relationship between central and local governments will be made based on the previous analysis.