Research On The Listing Way And The Protection Of Minority Shareholders Benefit In China

The protection of minority shareholders is both a focus observed by government and all social circles and one of the important targets of promoting corporate governance. There is a remarkable gap on protecting minority shareholders between western countries and China. It is just the social harm caused by the loss of minority shareholders that make protecting minority shareholders effectively becoming a hotspot increasingly.On the other hand,most listed companies are transformations of state-owed enterprises. In the view of the cost and trouble of reform ,a gradual mode was taken by government to joint stock system. At the same time,some firms transformed perfectly. So the listing way is a historic choice.The reseach purpose of this paper is,by the analysis of listing way,to discuss the behavior and mechanism of the ultimate shareholders and managers,to enrich the theory of protecting minority shareholders'interests and provide theoretical guidance for protecting minority shareholders.This paper mainly uses the normative research method and combines empiricle study analysis. The research approach is analyzing problem along a chain from the listing way to the benefit of minority shareholders. With the combing of correlative literature,this paper give a comment on insider control theory and ultimate shareholder's control theory. On the basis of classification for listing way,the paper analyzed the mechanism of listing way acting to the loss of minority shareholders'money and took the 82 IT listed companies in China as samples. Finally,the paper give some advice on protecting minority shareholders.The research shows that the listing way is a significant factor which influences the degree of the insider's control and minority shareholders'loss. Moreover,the ultimate shareholders and the managers collude to be insiders and control the company by obtain more seats of board and erode the interest of the company.