Family - Listed Companies' Ultimate Shareholder Emptying And Supporting Behavioral Conversion Interval Measurement

In July 1997, the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis broken the Asia’s rapid economic development, the research focusing on the field of corporate governance began to shift to the conflict of interests between ultimate shareholders and minority shareholders. Ultimate shareholders control problem was first put forward by La Porta et al in 1999, they found that the ultimate shareholders through the pyramid shareholding structure, cross-shareholdings and priority or binary voting shares holding structure, and other ways to maintain and expand the company’s actual control, and further to seek personal gain. In further study, however, the ultimate shareholders was not always tunneling the company, when the company encountered financial difficulties, the ultimate shareholders could help company with the pyramid shareholding structure. The stock right of ultimate shareholders in the family control was more concentrated than other types of companies, so the conflict problems of interests between the ultimate controlling families and minority shareholders, outside investors were more serious than other types of listed companies’, and more need to be addressed.Based on China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares in 2010-2014 of 632 listed family companies as research samples, firstly, we use descriptive statistics to depict tunneling behavior of the ultimate shareholders, and find that more than 50% of the family listed companies have tunneling behaviors in China. Secondly, Through dividing the ultimate shareholders’ control level and using the single factor analysis of variance, we find that the changes of ultimate shareholders’ control level can significantly affect the ultimate shareholders’ tunneling behavior, and illustrates its influence with interval effects. This paper further uses threshold panel analysis method to measure the behavior of ultimate shareholders’ tunneling and propping, and the influencing factors of ultimate shareholders’ tunneling behavior are analyzed. The results show that there is a significant interval effect between the nature of family ultimate control of listed companies and capital take-up, namely when the ultimate control level is below 21.0682%, there is a significant positive correlation between the ultimate control level and capital take-up, the ultimate shareholders of listed family companies is more likely behaving empty behavior; When the ultimate control level is more than 21.0682%, the ultimate control level and capital take-up have a significant negative correlation relationship, family ultimate shareholders of listed companies behave more implementation propping. In terms of influencing factors, two rights separation degree, the degree of marketization and capital take-up have a significant positive correlation, legalization and capital take-up level have significant negative relationship, and there is no significant influence between ownership balance ability and capital take-up.Finally, based on the study results of this article the author propose some policy suggestions from different angles, and hope that they are able to help curb the tunneling and propping behavior of the ultimate shareholders in the family listed companies.