Mechanism Design Of Protection Of State-owned Assets In Listed Companies' Mergers And Acquisitions

Corporate mergers and acquisitions activities are always the hot area of theory research and practice research in many national securities markets. At present,most Chinese listed companies are reformed from large and medium-sized state-owned enterprises, which structures are too broad and layout are too scattered. Their assets qualities are poor, and are lack of technological innovation and long-term source of funding etc. Although there are a huge of stock assets, their operating efficiencies are low. Implementation of mergers and acquisitions, alliance, bankruptcy can adjust the stock assets of businesses, optimize industrial structure and improve production efficiency, and promote the further development. While improving operational efficiency and the level of corporate governance, mergers and acquisitions activities also brought some problems. Especially in recent years, the problem of loss of state assets resulting from state-owned enterprises reforming, mergers and acquisitions activities in property transactions is becoming more and more serious. It has aroused great attention of governments. So how to prevent loss of state assets and to protect the right of state-owned shares in the process of listed companies acquiring state-owned enterprises is an important and urgent problem. Based on the starting point, the research objective is to design an incentive and restraint mechanism to make management's personal interests in state-owned enterprises compatible with the objective of government and to provide a good foundation to protect state shares in mergers and acquisitions activities of listed companies in China.This article is the research on problem of loss of state assets in mergers and acquisitions of listed companies. First of all, introducing the concepts of state-owned assets and the loss of state assets; secondly classifying the types and means of loss of state assets in the current property transactions; then using the theory of mechanism design to analyze management incentive and restraint mechanisms to prevent loss of state-owned assets in the mergers and acquisitions activities; finally, analyzing a typical case of acquiring state-owned assets, and providing some directional recommendations based on existent problems. Hoping to improve the state-owned assets management system and to provide some enlightenment to prevent loss of state assets in property transactions.