Study On Internal Governance Structure Of Asset Evaluation Agencies Based On Information Asymmetry

Asset evaluation agencies are intermediary organizations which provide customers asset value judgment service. Through providing assessment services to the society, they promote the reform of enterprise property system and ensure optimized disposition and reasonable flowing of social resources. In recent years, the quantity of asset evaluation agencies in China is increasing rapidly, so does the number of evaluators. As a result, the competitions among the asset evaluation agencies become more and more fierce, and some questions come into being gradually, which affect the healthy development of the assets evaluation industry. Besides some macroscopic reasons such as starting to late, small scale, imperfect operation environment and so on, another important reason is that there is not a series of effective microcosmic organization framework and operating mechanism established in our country's asset evaluation agencies. Therefore, the perfection of internal governance structure plays a significant role in ensuring the quality of evaluation report, which is also a question waiting to be solved urgently in the development of China's asset evaluation agencies. The rationality and validity of internal governance structure of asset evaluation agencies will have a direct impact on their own managerial effectiveness and service level, and the overall level of internal governance structure of asset evaluation agencies will have a direct impact on its image and service efficiency. It is the need of their own development to perfect internal governance structure, and standardize and restrain the behaviors of money capital and human resource capital owners and other stakeholders, and it is also the objective requirement of the industry.Studying from the internal governance structure of asset evaluation agencies, the paper sets the study scope of the large asset evaluation agencies with complete internal organizational structure and independent professional assessment, and makes the assumptions that the stakeholders in the in asset evaluation agencies are economic men. Based on the theory of internal governance structure and information asymmetry, the paper analyzes the special developing process of our country's asset evaluation agencies and investigates the influences of product characteristic of asset evaluation agencies, the features of human capital and non-human capital and the enterprise culture characteristics of internal governance structure of asset evaluation agencies. The focus of this paper is to study the adverse selection problem and moral hazard problem produced in the circumstance of the principle-agent relationship among stakeholders, to be more important, and how to reduce the risk of principal-agent and improve the operating efficiency of elevation agencies.According to the line of this paper, we can divide the paper into three major parts. First, under the conditions of the research scope and the research supposition, information asymmetry theory is introduced to internal governance structure of asset evaluation agencies, and I set forth that the asset evaluation agencies, as company system enterprises, have their own distinguish characteristics compared with general enterprises and reveal the imbalance of the internal governance structure brought about by the information asymmetry among the stakeholders in evaluation agencies. Second, I use the relative theory on economics to analyze the internal governance structure problems caused by information asymmetry during the process of the appointment and occupational practice of the staff members, that's to say, adverse selection and moral hazard problems, and analyze the deep reasons by theoretical model. Finally, combined with the current situation of the internal governance structure of asset evaluation agencies in our country, we can solve the adverse selection problem by overcoming adverse selection problems through establishment of signal transmission and discriminating mechanism, and solve the moral hazard problems in occupational practice through drive restraint mechanism, and we will take cultural construction as the soul of the optimization of internal governance structure.