The Theoretical Research Of Combinatorial Auction Mechanism Design

Recently,with the rapid development of computer technology and Electronic commerce,the practical need of multi-unit auction,lots of traditional auction theory and assumption already didn't adapt to the new auction economic situation.Investigators try to design and use some format auctions which are suit for complex products.Multi-unit combinatorial auction become a hot research.This paper focuses on the combinatorial auction mechanism design theory.In the course of researching,we use the method of theoretic prove, calculable example elucidatory,comparative analysis and so on.Firstly, the paper summarizes traditional auction theory by the numbers.Then aiming at the combinatorial auction actuality,we fetch out the theoretical research of combinatorial auction mechanism design.Secondly,the paper detailed discuss the single-stage combinatorial auction mechanism (Vickrey-Clark-Groves,first-price package auction,ascending proxy auction).It comprises auction theoretical mode,auction process, mechanism design problems,mechanism's merit and demerit.Especially, the paper proves important theoretic properties of VCG mechanism,it is worth notice that many auction mechanisms use VCG as a reference point for judging theoretic significance.Thirdly,the paper detailed discuss on multi-stages combinatorial auction mechanisms,consisting of two-stages and three-stages.Above all, we discuss the basic procedure of two-stages combinatorial auction (Clock-Proxy auction) mechanisms design and analyze three design questions of Clock-Proxy auction,including limit of demand variety, enactment of price increments,end of auction phase.And then we analyze three-stages combinatorial mechanisms,including the design idea and process.It turns out that on the one hand the Clock-Proxy auction is a having good performance hybrid auction,which combines the clock auctions simplicity,transparency,keeping privacy and the sealed-tender proxy auction of efficiency;on the other hand the new type three-stages hybrid auction mechanism design not only have both Progressive Adaptive User Selection Environment(PAUSE) and Clock-Proxy auction of benefits,but also can conquer a lot of its vices,provide price information on any bundle(expressing bundle synergy information,it will be lost or distortion under the linear prices),at the same time reduce free-riders.This three-stages auction mechanism has several attractive properties.Its theoretical landscape is very good.The paper also point out multitudinous combinatorial mechanisms applied situation that will be able to probably offer suggest for actualizing the scenario of combinatorial auction.