Study Of Construction Bidding On The Basis Of Design-Enclosed Auction With Game Theory

Formed in a long term economic practices, bidding and inviting bidding is a very important means of collocating resources. With the standardization of the construction industry, it has been widely used in China. However, some times the way of drawing selecting measures tends to be irrational and many problems thus appeared. To encourage bidders with credit offering a competitive price is a key issue in drawing selecting measures, which is also the focus of this dissertation.This paper refers to representative theories of auction and bidding. Both qualitative and quantitative analyses of the behaviors of all parties in construction bidding are made by using game theory models and in view of the unique feature of design-enclosed auction.It starts from summarizing theories of bidding and auction. Then the situation of bidding's practice in China and the experiences of the design-enclosed auction used in the Zhenjiang-Yangzhou Yangzi river bridge project are introduced. The major part focuses on discussing possible behaviors and responses of all parties in construction bidding on the basis of design-enclosed-sealed auction by building two dynamic bidding models.By analyzing these two models, the regulations in both the business and the technology part of the design-enclosed auction prove to be reasonable. The results indicate that although there's information asymmetry between tenderee and bidders in construction bidding, by designing effective selecting measures, the anticipating profits of all bidders can be changed and thus their strategies influenced, finally the anticipating profit of the tenderee can increase.