A Study On The Listed Companies' Related Transactions And Large Shareholders' Invasion Behavior

Related Transactions play roles of reducing transaction costs and improving the trading efficiency, and related transaction itself is non-fair by nature, but the essential inequality for each side in transaction status makes it an important means to invade and occupy listed companies for large shareholders. Due to the defects of the stock right structure, security market system design, company governance and external supervision, etc. in China, it is a general phenomenon for large shareholders' invasion. This not only damages interests of the minority stockholders in listed companies but also is not conducive to stability of the stock market. Therefore, the issues of maximizing favorable factors and minimize unfavorable ones, bringing the positives of related transaction into play and protecting legitimate rights of minority stockholders become hot in stock market.This thesis analyzed related transaction and large shareholders' invasion behavior in theory at first, including the definition and theoretical source of the related transaction, the fairness of related transaction and the condition, reason and means for large shareholders' invasion behavior in listed companies in China. Then an example of listed company—manufacturing industry is given, which is to investigate China's listed companies' current situations and characteristics of related transaction in recent years and to examine the relation between the invasion behavior of large stockholders and related transaction of listed company and the influential factors of the related transaction scale in listed companies through establishing linear regression model. Finally, based on the summary of above-mentioned research and China's actual situation, the thesis advances corresponding proposals for the large shareholders invasion behavior in listed companies in China.