The Game Analysis On Accounting Information Regulation Of Listed Companies And Inspiring Suggestions On Optimization

The study on accounting information regulation of listed companies has been started relatively late in China which makes the accounting information regulation system of listed companies become the important problem to be solved. Arising from the weak marketability of securities market, public goods nature of accounting information and the asymmetry of information, the converse choice and moral risk conduced to several economic cases in recent years, and caused investors losses, contemporarily, they seriously interfered the smoothly operated securities market and even the development of market economy. Therefore, studying on how to improve accounting information regulation system will bring us practical significance.The dissertation is based on regulation economics and gaming theory, started with relative theories and taking the normative research method, the dissertation puts up with the concept of accounting information regulation of listed companies and the necessity of strengthening the accounting regulation. By analyzing the current situation of accounting information regulation system of listed companies, the dissertation establishes structural system of accounting information system. The three main factors that influence accounting information regulation of listed companies, is main body of regulation, internal control of the listed companies as well as the compliance of disclosing accounting information, the author of dissertation concluded that the omission degree of accounting information regulation organs of listed companies is proportionally to the government supervise and investigation, and inversely proportional to the tangible loss that caused by the investigated omission and the side effects to the society which is brought about by omission, the above conclusion is got by analyzing the gaming model of accounting information regulation organs of listed companies and the inspection pf people. The omission probability happens to the staff of accounting information regulation organs of listed companies varies directly with their rent-seeking benefits, and possibly varies inversely to the punishment they would bear; We can definitely say that there are two most influential factors bringing about the distempered internal control of listed companies, one is the shareholders'inspection to the company and the other is most managers choose to conspire with each other and damage the benefits of company. Analyzing through gaming theory, the large shareholders commit more efforts to inspection, while the small shareholders are waiting for getting equal benefit without paying any price, which makes the inspection severely deficient. The conspiracy of managers is based on analysis of cost and benefits, delicate division of work and pinning down each other will help prevent such damage activities happening again and again; The accounting information disclosure regulation of listed companies involves regulating both listed companies and accountant office, what mainly affects the quality of disclosing accounting information is the punishment degree and inspection cost of securities regulatory commission. Whether an accountant office will fraud or not while auditing depends on probability they discover the fraud of listed companies, in other words, it means the professional level of accountant office and the CPA. Advancing optimization strategies, we should take measures from cost and benefit, strengthen supervision of regulatory organs and persons, reinforce the regulation of internal control of listed companies, and add the certified public accountant's evaluation to internal control of listed companies, regulating the related parties'activities of accounting information disclosure, is of great importance to improve accounting information regulation system of our country.