Empirical Research On Ultimate Ownership Structure And Corporate Performance

In the field of corporate governance, the ultimate ownership structure has increasingly become the focus for the researchers. The central problem that a lot of nonstandard behaviors of security market of our country is ultimate control rights. The ultimate controllers control the corporation by pyramids-shareholdings or cross-shareholdings and the characteristic is adevition between the control rights and the cash flow rights. It may lead to the result that proprietary shareholders exploit the medium and small investors heavily. Because at present the legal protection of small and medium shareholders are not perfect in our country, so it has very important practical significance for us to study the ultimate ownership structure of the listed companies. Therefore, in order to put forward reasonable suggestions for the protection of small and medium share-holders,it is necessary to analyze this problem from the prospects of theory and practice.At the basis of the relevant research achievements and equity theory, finding the ultimate controller through equity structure chains, firstly the artical analyzes the relation between the ultimate ownership structure and corporate performance, and puts forward the hypothesis, then, using the statistical software SPSS17.0 and Excel 2003, seclecting 271 manufacturing industry listed company Hu stock market as a sample in 2008-2010 to reach the following conclusion through the regression model of the descriptive statistics and regression examine:The nature of the ultimate controller for state-owned companies performance is not significantly lower than' the performance of private-owned companies; The listed manufacturing companies in China have serious separation between the ultimate control rights and the cash flow rights, the two power separation of private-owned companies is significantly lower than the state-owned companies; The result shows that the relationship between the control rights and the performance is none-linear:a converse N shape.The inflexions are 23.67% and 64.95%; the cash flow right of the listed companies in China is positively related to the performance; The degree of the two power separation from the listed companies in China negatively correlates with corporate performance; The listed companies in China actually control the two rights separation degree negatively correlate with corporate performance; State control of the listed company pyramid holding the reasonable arrangement of hierarchy has some of the incentive effect, but premium effect and is not obvious, and the performance is best when the control level is 4. However, the relation between the control levels of the private-owned companies and company performance is negative, not through the significant level of 0.05 significant inspection, but if the significant level relaxes to 0.1, the result is just through the significant inspection; the degree of ownership balance, the company size and growth have a significant positive correlation with the corporate performance and the effect of capital structure performance produce significantly negative correlation influence that leverage effect not to improve performance of the company plays a promoting role. Finally, on the base of research results, this paper puts forward relevant policy Suggestions, and summarize the research results of the full text,at last,the article puts forward the prospect of future research.