Research On The Incentive Of The Agency In Non-profit Public Projects Based On Market Agent Construction System

This dissertation has systematically studied the incentive mechanism of agent in non-profit public projects. On the basis of economic incentive theories, this dissertation grouped the incentive mechanism of the agent into two categories: explicit incentive mechanism and implicit incentive mechanism. The study then developed follow the two perspectives. The main contents are summarized as follows:Firstly, it made an investigation and analysis of the practicing situation of the agent's incentive mechanism and concluded the disadvantages.Secondly, it reviewed principle-agent theory and risk allocation mechanism. It the explicit incentive mechanism of which the reward incentive is dominant. And then, it made a comparison between the theoretical results and the practicing situation and gave the advice of improving the incentive mechanism of the agent. Based on the analysis of risks of non-profit public projects, this dissertation established an incentive risk-sharing method. It established the reward incentive method according to the various combination of risk preferences of the principal and the agent.Thirdly, it reviewed the reputation theory and established the agent's implicit incentive mechanism based on agent's reputation. In the situation of repeated games and competitive market of agents, reputation can be an incentive to the agent. This dissertation made a systematical study on the formation, evaluation and function of reputation and established the evaluation index system of reputation. After that, it analyzed the practicing situation of the agent's reputation mechanism and gave the advice of improving this mechanism.