Study On The Incentive Mechanism In Land Requisition Based On Dual Principal-agent

With the expanding of urbanization, the land requisition problem of which the unfair sharing of benefits among central government, local government, village collective and peasant has been becoming more and more severity, and the land requisition conflicts happen usually. In order to solving these problems, the relationship of the benefit contradictions among the main bodies and the land requisition conflicts should be revealed at first to find out the main bodies in land requisition. And the key point of this relationship is to deduce the basic regular pattern of choosing the strategy in game among main bodies.This paper based on the double principal-agent theory in New Institution Economics is to reveal the principal-agent relationship which is constituted by the explicit contract and the implicit contract of the land requisition subjects exist the game strategy between the inside and outside of the contract. And the different strategies come from the demonstrating dual principal-agent relationship by using Game Theory. Meanwhile, there is a discovery that the behavior of government functionary is the true reason of the game strategy, which base on the bureaucratic economic theory. Because the official is the impetus, there is an incentive mechanism and concrete measures designed to solve the dual principal-agent relationship problem by the using of Cobb-Douglas Production Function. At last, we demonstrate the above conclusion by the case study.The paper analyzed the land requisition process by the dual principal-agent theory discriminate the driving force of main bodies during the land requisition process, and conclude the game strategy between the subjects. To solve the dual principal-agent problems during the land requisition process, we design an incentive mechanism for land requisition system, and propound recommendations to consummate land requisition system.