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A Dynamic Game Research Between The Government Regulation And The Pollutant Discharging Enterprises

Posted on:2010-02-27Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H J ChengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360278980017Subject:Applied Mathematics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Along with the development of production, the continuous improvement of living standards, environmental problem are becoming more and more prominent, and therefore the work of environmental governance for sustainable development has become an important social activity. Researches on how to control environmental pollution caused by Pollutant Discharging Enterprises are not only a forward-looking issue of great importance of environmental econonmics and environmental management but also an urgent problem-of-reality needed to be addressed at present. So the topic of this article has its theoretical value and important application value as well.In fact, since there is a high degree of information asymmetry between the Government and Pollutant Discharging Enterprises, the lack of effective strategies to ensure Pollutant Discharging Enterprises to transit from avoiding inspection to discharge illegally to reducing pollutants discharges by increasing necessary input, too much dependence on the moral constraints and punishment deterrence as well as the occasional negligence of oversight, causing the Pollutants Discharing Enterprises opportunity of income much higher than their opportunity loss. This urges the Government to establish an effective-based, prevention, mechanism to ensure the change of Pollutant Discharging Enterprises from passive pollution, prevention to active pollution prevention to serve to government's effective oversight and better management.In this paper, from the perspecitice of Government action of revealing real and effective Pollutant Discharging Enterprises information, and for the effort in terms of differences that Pollutant Discharging Enterprises input of the pollutant discharging facilities to reduce the initial cost, the relationship of static–incentives- monitor, dynamic game, dynamic–incentives- monitor between the Government and Pollutant Discharging Enterprises is analyzed.In this paper, through the application of environmental economics, incentive theory, contract theory, game theory, information economics and theories and methods, a two nonlinear principal - agent model is set up, by theoretical analysis of the optimization problem of existence of solutions, model robustness and simulation based on Matlab, a series of meaningful results are obtained, thesis also attempts to set up the game analysis of basic theoretical framework between Government and Pollutant Discharging Enterprises to provide a theoretical reference for further systematic research and envirement-related policies development .
Keywords/Search Tags:principal - agent model, information asymmetry, bi-level programming, dynamic game, simulation
PDF Full Text Request
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