Study On Correlativity Of The Corporate Governance And The Management Performance Of Listed Companies

The common equity structure is the core problem of the corporate governance. A reasonable common equity structure plays an active role in the efficiency of the corporate governance. Therefore, a reasonable common equity structure should be set up first when we design the corporate governance. In China, most of the listed companies came from restructured state-owned enterprises, bearing special corporate governance. This paper tends to explore the relationship between the corporate governance of China listed companies and its performance.In modern corporate enterprises, the corporate governance reflects in three levels, shareholders, board of trustees and managers, due to the separation of ownership and control power. The inner part control of these three greatly economic corpuses and it mutual checks and balances of the relation together constitute the total frame of the company internal control. The inner part control directly relates to the realization of the right check and balance, the interests of the shareholders and the improvement of company performance. The paper analyzes these three levels respectively first up of inner part control circumstance, then unify three control powers of dimensions to set up an internal control comprehensive model, the study may exist of concrete of inner part control mode. This text mainly studies the company internal category of internal control condition and company conduct the relation of results, analytical in the theories with the substantial evidence analyze of foundation up, study our country listed company of internal control appearance and its existence of key problem, thus for pass excellent turn inner part control to raise the company management results to provide a worthy suggestion.The paper mainly concludes that there is a notable correlation between the shareholders 'control power and company's performance. The more stakes the controlling shareholders have, the existence of the controlling shareholders will be more helpful to prove the company performance. The governance structure of board and the leader structure of manager have no obvious influence on corporate performance. The corporate governance relationship is not clear. Power balance mechanism is failed. The function of the board is replaced by the highly focused ownership structure. The controlling shareholder who holds high percentage shares played the main role in corporate performance in our country now. From the real controlling rights allocation situation, the boards have the characteristic of independence or power balance. But this is just on the surface. It has not played positive influences for corporate performance. Corporate performances of companies which the shares are highly held by one holder are better than the companies which the shares are scattered relatively and have the controlling power separation mechanism in china now. These conclusions show that to optimize the corporate controlling rights allocation mode of our country's listed company is very urgent and crucial for the improvement of corporate performance.The paper's main contribution and creation lies the systematical analysis on three levels-shareholders, board of directors, manager's layer of corporate governance, puts forward a concrete inner part control mode, make statistical analysis on the circulation of various modes used in China listed companies.Study shows that, currently China listed company governance has more excellent allocation of formality, but the company management results are relatively worse. This explains that our country listed company control power allocation influence management results of the main obstacle lie in and manage follow inner part control relation, effectively resolve to entrust an agency problem.