Research On Incentive And Disciplinary Mechanism Of Executives In State-owned Enterprises

The incentive constraint on the executive is always a highlighted and important issue, no matter in the reform of state-owned enterprises to establish modern enterprise system and perfect the management of corporation, or in the exploitation and use of enterprise human resources, which is decided by the special status of executive in modern enterprise and the nature of separation between managerial authority and ownership. The incentive constraint on Executives theory is now the focus of Theory horizon and business world. Up to now, some scholars, combine the actual situation of Chinese enterprises, have done a number of useful research and exploration to executives incentive. However, from the collection of this information, there is little positivity research and even less positivity research aimed at the special place from the scholars in domestic. This article is based on the research environment then take the research questions, namely, the state-owned listed company in Shandong Province Incentive situation and how effective incentive mechanism, and giving suggestion and measurement according to the results based on the empirical analysis.This article is based on Shandong area, the object of study was state-owned executives, proposed research hypotheses based on previous studies, using the scientific method of mathematical statistics to analysis the hypothesis. The conclusion of this article indicated:The main incentive method to state-owned executive in Shandong province is annual salary operator holding two ways. There is big difference among different company of executive annual salary, but little difference among different area and business. The manager who is also as chairman has more salary then the one who is not chairman. There is only less than one-third of listed state-owned Shandong Province take the incentive method of executives holding company, The one who has adopted Managerial Stock Ownership of listed companies is in nearly 50% stake and in the three ten thousandths executives around, which is in lower level of overall holdings. Salary and enterprise performance was a significant positive correlation, while the operator stake and corporate performance are not relevant. Finally, according to the results improve the proposed measures of state-owned listed company in Shandong Province incentive mechanism.This study is divided into six parts. The first part is introduction, which introduces the research background, purpose, research ideas and research methods; the second part is the literature review and some theoretical basis, mainly introduce literature and empirical research of executives, incentive mechanism and encourage executives; The third and fourth part is the Empirical part and the third parts is the explanation of the evidence design, sample selection and the selection of indicators and data processing method, the fourth part analysis the sample data on the number of statistical and then verifys the proposed hypothesis; the fifth section summarizes the conclusions, improves the proposed measures of state-owned listed companies in Shandong Province; the sixth part is the concluding part, the part of the thesis summarizes the innovations and shortcomings, and make the need for further research.