The Research About Listed Company On Economies Analysis And Contents Norm Of Accounting Information Disclosure

With the development of market economy and the arrival of information era, the information market is being more and more important in entire market system. Accounting information, which gradually occupied the securities market, has been highly depended on in economic decisions making, and has become the focus of the accounting theory and practice, and also as an important object in the securities market theory and practical operation norm. Disclosing accounting information rationally and efficiently which is important to improve the relationship between operator and investor, develop and perfect capital market, can realize Pareto efficiency on resources allocation. The quality of the accounting information disclosure effects the running effciency of the stock market in great sense but the quality issue of disclosing accounting information is a main actor to impede the developing of our securities market in our listed companies, which discourages investors, lessens resources allocation efficiency or even worse and disturbs the development of our securities market. It is very important the oretically and realistically to analyze the reason and search for the countermeasures for this.This article starts with the basis definition of accounting information disclosure, analyzes its economic features and explains its basic economic theory. We conclude the regulations and fundamental contents in Chinese listed companies, by the analysis on exiting problems. In terms of efficiency market theory, information asymmetry theory, game theory, S-D theory and cost-benefit theory, this article gives us the theory basis of accounting information disclosure system. We manifest the problems existed in accounting information disclosure system of Chinese listed companies. We analyze the problems deeply by using the theories mentioned above to get the resolutions to resolve the problems. At last, we proposes four propositions of perfecting accounting information disclosure system.There are some new points in this paper: this article attempts to introduce game theory, cost-benefit theory and entrust-agency theory into the analysis structure on listed companies' accounting information disclosure. It points out that listed companies' false accounting information disclosure is the equilibrium result of measuring relevant groups' interests and the final result of the null entrust-agency mechanism inside company and high cost of disclosure. While analyzing accounting information disclosure system, this article illustrates the importance of supervision, offers a way that accounting information should be offered with the regulation and proposes settlements from economic perspective.