Research On The Efficiency Losses Of Administrative Monopoly

The local administrative monopoly is one kind of special performance during economical switch time in our country, which refers to that the local authority carries on the limit or the repel to the market competition using the administrative authority(Liangchun Yu, Donghua Yu,2009). This dissertation summarizes the representation of local administrative monopoly since mid-1990s using Factors Price Distortions as point of penetration, and analyzes theoretically capital allocation efficient caused by local administrative monopoly, over-competitive efficiency and macro-cost efficiency respectively, then takes the empirical test.Chapter 2 uses the topicality administrative monopoly index(Yu Liangchun,Yu Donghua(2009)) in the expansive capital allocation effects reckoning model(Wurgler (2000)), and it empirically studies how does the topicality administrative monopoly affect capital allocation effects between the profession and the area. The results confirm that the topicality administrative monopoly causes the reversed U influence to the capital allocation effects between the profession and the area, and, to the most viewpoints, the topicality administrative monopoly does not favor the capital effective disposition. This article's discovery is steady, and it confirms that eliminating the topicality administrative monopoly will be helpful to the improvement of capital allocation effects.Chapter 3 redefines the concept of over-competition, and in theory analyzes how local administrative monopoly leads to over-competition and the loss of efficiency, according to the DEA model about estimating cost efficiency; then we suggest the related hypothesis; then using the principal component we analyze and evaluate the situation of over-competition on China's 37 industries, then we select the food industry and estimate the cost efficiency. panel data empirical test result shows that the local administrative monopoly is an important factor that leads to efficiency loss of over-competition.Chapter 4 analyzes theoretically the function of the macro-cost efficiency lost caused by the local administrative monopoly using DEA Model which tests the macro-cost efficiency about manufacture industry in China from 1999 to 2006. The result indicates that the upper and lower limits of macro-cost efficiency lost caused by local administrative monopoly from 1999 to 2001 both show moderating trend, whereas show uptrend from 2002 to 2006, which means local administrative monopoly comes to life again in recent years. Take the year 2006 for instance, maintaining the existing output and eliminating the local administrative monopoly could decrease 11.8%-29.2% input in manufacture sectors.Chapter 5 firstly indicates the limit of Fiscal Decentralization Theory and Political Promotion Theory in explaining the cause of local administrative monopoly and then propose a theoretical framework which explain the cause of local administrative monopoly preliminarily:Local Government Competition-Budget Soft-Constraint. After that, the dissertation offers policy suggestions which could break the local administrative monopoly and build a united market from hardening the budget soft-constrain, reforming officer achievement assessment system, weakening "Political Entrepreneur" role of local government officer and building regional negotiation and cooperation mechanism point of view respectively.