Study On Bank Risk-taking From The Perspective Of Corporate Governance

Recent years, under the financial crisis sweeping the global from America subprimemortgage, there frequently appeared, such as merger and acquisition of banks,governmenttaking-over,even bankruptcy. Therefore, the problem of bank risk-taking became concernof all walks of life again. For a long time, there are many literatures study the bank risktakingfrom the perspective of macro-level, while the number of the relative study from theperspective of micro-level is few, especially from the corporate governance of banksthemselves. This paper will study the problem of bank risk-taking, under the perspective ofcorporate governance, referring the relative classic and cutting-edge theories. For avoidingthe limitation of single risk index, about the measurement of risk-taking, this paper usesynthesize indicators to measure the bank risk-taking. Finally, this paper carries on theempirical analysis, based on the sample of the listed commercial banks of our country from2002 to 2008,the result of which finds out: (1)With the common influence of theshareholders of "moral hazard",the entrenchment of manager,the group decision-makingeffect and the equity balance, there are relationship with situation between the ownershipconcentration and bank risk-taking. In detail, they are nonlinear U-relations——overdispersionor over-concentration of equity are likely to lead to a higher risk-taking, whilethe relative concentration of ownership could lead to a lower risk banks; (2)With thecomposite influence of the group decision-making effect and the problem of agency, thesize of board have negative relation with the bank risk-taking,the fluctuations ofperformance and bank risk-taking; (3)The proportion of independent directors andallowance have positive relation with the bank risk-taking, resulting from the problem ofagency and incentive effect; (4)CEO power is not significant to bank risk-taking, but it hasthe negative relation with bankruptcy risk. This study can provide some valuable evidenceof decision-taking for the majority of interest relatives; and some useful policy reference forfurther reform of commercial banks as well as"post- crisis of financial".