A Study On The Debt Under The Separation Framework From Control And Cash Right Of Private Listed Company

Scholars began to research the problem of Debt maturity structure in 20th century 70's.By now, Scholars is rich in this field of research. In recent years, the research of corporate governance promote vigorous development of corporate debt maturity structure of deep research, scholars begin to pay close attention to corporate governance research from the Angle of debt maturity structure. Recent studies show that the ultimate controlling shareholder occupy the interests of small and medium shareholders, and creditors of the listed company's internal has become an important problem, especially in the agent of private or family listed companies. Based on this, the paper made private companies as the sample.First, this paper analyze control and cash flow right theory and corporate debt maturity structure theory. Then, it analyze the Chinese private listed companies control, cash flow right distribution In-depth, and analyze Private listed companies on the debt financing structure. Then, from the perspective of positivism, private listed companies in China, and the control of cash flow right separation and debt maturity structure were studied. Main conclusions are as follows:①On one hand, the private listed companies is short-term debt financing, but long-term debt accounted for only a small proportion. On the other hand, the ultimate control and cash flow rights of China's private listed companies exist certain deviation. Overall, control and cash flow rights in multiples is more than five times, but some private listed companies is even reached the 11 times.②By means of regression analysis ,it found that the ultimate control of controlling shareholders, cash flow right deviation degree and debt maturity structure, control have negative correlation with the cash flow right deviation degree of the listed company, the lower level of long-term debt. Control and cash flow right consistency are related to debt maturity structure. Control and cash flow right that the shareholder exploitation, the ultimate tend to agree the incentives will weaken, relative to the financing behavior of listed companies is more reasonable. Therefore, the listed company are relatively easy to obtain long-term debt.In the end, according to the theory and empirical analysis , the paper have the conclusion that how to give full play to the role of external management mechanism in corporate debt maturity structure optimization and puts for ward relevant policy Suggestions.