The Empirical Study Of Ultimate Controlling Shareholder And Corporate Performance Relationship

Since the reform and opening up, with the sustained development of China’s marketeconomy, private enterprises play in the economy and societyincreasingly significant rolecan not be ignored Chinese, become one of theeconomic development of the importantenterprise group. Private enterprises have become the current rapid development Chineseeconomy the most active part, however, from the current situation of China’s privatelisting Corporationoverall governance status than non private listing Corporation, theconflict of interest between the ultimate controlling shareholders and minorityshareholdersis more serious, the predatory behavior and motivation. China’s current legalprotection of minority shareholders is not perfect, the ultimate controlling shareholderstend to take the subtle and complex means of implementing the "empty", the listingCorporation, therefore, this paper studies on the relationship of private listing Corporationultimate ownership structure and corporate performance from theory and practice, and theseparation of two rights case the different ways of listing, and ultimate control in differentways into the study,detailed analysis of its impact on corporate performance, the ultimateownership structure, improve business performance, and promote enterprise sustainableand healthy has an important realistic significance for the development and protection ofthe legitimate rights and interests of small shareholders.This article selects the Shanghai and shenzhen in2010a2012private listedcompanies as samples, the two cities from the ultimate controlling shareholders and theinterests of other shareholders divergence Angle, empirical analysis of the control, cashflow rights and control and cash flow right deviation impact on the performance ofprivate listed company, and on the basis of investigation the different ways of public andprivate listed companies control the ultimate impact on corporate performance. Throughmultiple regression analysis we find that: for China’s private listed companies, proportioncontrol of ultimate controlling shareholder and corporate performance show significantnonlinear relationship, with the percentage of ultimate controlling shareholder controlgradually increase, the performance of private listed company showed increased after thefirst drop of inverted "U" type characteristic; Cash flow rights of ultimate controllingshareholders, the more the better the performance of listed companies, the cash flowrights and corporate performance has a significant positive correlation; Two rightsseparation factor and enterprise performance has significant negative correlation relationship, the two rights separation degree, the greater the enterprise performance andvalue is lower; In this paper, a virtual variable is introduced to further distinguish betweendirect and indirect listed companies of listed companies, the pyramid control mode withother control method, and comparison analysis, the results showed that relative to thelisted companies directly, indirectly, the two rights of listed companies deviate from agreater degree of negative correlation degree and the corporate performance, the ultimatecontrolling shareholders to the interests of minority shareholders abuse degree isrelatively higher; Relative to other control methods, the pyramid control mode canenhance the two rights separation of ultimate controlling shareholder, the negative effecton the corporate performance. In the case of lack of investor protection mechanism, thepyramid control mode for the ultimate controlling shareholder provides convenient accessto private benefits of control channel, increase its violate the interests of minorityshareholders.On the basis of empirical research, this paper based on results of the study, from theaspects of national macro policy and practices two aspects of ultimate controllingshareholder, put forward the relevant policy recommendations, to perfect the supervisionand management of the private enterprises, protecting the legal rights and interests ofminority shareholders has the vital significance. At the same time in at the end of thisarticle points out the article studies the limitations and direction for further study.