The Research On Executive Compensation Of State-owned Listed Enterprises

Recently, the issue of emoluments of employees from state-owned firms, especially those received by employees from monopolistic state-owned firms, is becoming the hot spot of discussion among the government and scholars. Resting on the standpoint of separation between ownership and management right which comes from modern enterprise theory, the huge difference of the ownership between private and state-owned enterprises under the socialist economic pattern with Chinese characteristics raises a series of new problems within management science realm. Establishing in China's actual conditions, this article couples theoretical study of emoluments to the real world. In addition, by using research approaches such as inference of theory-in-use, verification of the hypothesis as well as empirical analysis, it also analyses the determinants of both state-owned enterprises'status in quo and the emoluments of senior executives in state-owned enterprises, and researches on the relationship between emoluments of senior executives and the enterprises' performance, and talks over the emolument-motivation scheme which is adoptable to current model; on the whole, studies the issue of emolument system of Chinese state-owned listed enterprises in an overall, scientific and systematic manner.The present study reviews theoretical overviews such as current design and application of senior executives'emolument-motivation system both at home and abroad. And then analyses the determinants of senior executives' emoluments in listed enterprises, discovering that the emoluments of senior executives in state-owned listed enterprises were significantly affected by factors such as enterprises' performance, scale, the number of independent directors and company risk; in addition, the senior executives in listed enterprises which lead in strategic investors enjoy obvious higher emoluments than those in other listed enterprises. The confirmation of these determinants provides a series of quantitative indicators to the design of emoluments. On that basis, this study analyses the relationship between emoluments of senior executives in listed enterprises and the actual performance of those enterprises; considering the multiplicity of enterprises'managerial performance, this article adopts the principal component analysis method to structure the comprehensive performance indicators of listed enterprises, and basing on this premise, performs comparative studies from two sides using Chinese state-owned and private enterprises as samples. The result indicates that the impact of private enterprises' performance on senior executives' emoluments is more significant than that of state-owned enterprises; it also indicates that senior executives in state-owned enterprises with foreign shareholders enjoy higher emoluments while such difference has not been manifested when comparing private enterprises with or without foreign shareholders. From the perspective of real world application, the conclusion puts forward some relative policy suggestions on macroscopical level as well as emolument suggestions on microscopical level, providing valuable recommendations to the reform of state-owned enterprises'emolument system.