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Dynamic Tracking And Effect Assessment Of Chinese State-owned Enterprise Reform In Senior Management Salary System

Posted on:2015-11-03Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y DengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2309330434957147Subject:Political economy
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years, as the reform of China’s state-owned enterprises continue to pushforward, state executive pay system reform has become a difficult problem. At present,the main problem of state executive pay is the endless appearance of abnormal highsalaries; Executive pay and performance often not linked. Overall, the growth of stateexecutive salaries deviates from the normal growth rate. In this paper, the studies Onthe reform of state executive pay system based on rationality perspective ofSalary-making process. Through the perspective of State executive power, the paysystem linked with executive salaries,and using this clue to study dynamic trackingand impact assessment of executive salaries system reform and look forward to getsome meaningful suggestions on the current state executive pay system reform.Firstly, the article study the theoretical literature on executive compensationsystem.Combined with the actual operation of the pay system, the article criticize theanalysis thinking of the optimal contract theory and get the theoretical framework oftwo-dimensional power on executive compensation system. Along themacro-background of SOE reform, the article detailed described the changing processof SOE executive pay and remark it by two-dimensional power. Finally, in order totest the validity of the theoretical framework and effect of institutional reform, thearticle use the two periods data of listed state-owned enterprises: from1999to2002;from2003to2012to do empirical analysis, along with three models: the influence thatthe powers on remuneration, powers on pay-performance sensitivity and power onremuneration viscous. The empirical analysis results showed that with the reform ofthe salary system of state-owned enterprises, the Control authority of executives in theenterprise is growing, while the supervise is declining, thus they use their own powersto intervene the salary-making process to obtain a high salary.Therefore, the article concludes with a few suggestions:1, perfect systemconstruction, ensure effective operation of the "two powers";2, deepen the reform ofstate-owned property, safeguard the legitimate interests of the subject property;3,sound governance structure of state-owned enterprises, promote the balance of power;4, enhance the dynamic mechanism of SOE salaries, stimulate the enthusiasm of executives.
Keywords/Search Tags:state-owned enterprises executives, pay system, senior executive power, dynamic tracking, effect assessment
PDF Full Text Request
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