| Since 1980s, rank order tournaments as competitive compensation mechanisms have become quite popular for providing incentives in employment relationships. Since only the ordinal ranking of the agents'output is decisive for obtaining the winner prize, each agent could in principle improve his position not only by increasing his own output but also by exerting destructive effort to decrease the output of competitors. In real-world contests, sabotaging can hardly be observed by a third party, because it is generally performed in secret.Our research expanded tournament model, intends to conduct a controlled experiment in the laboratory to focus on sabotage in contests with heterogeneous agents. According to our experiment players may sabotage each other at the first stage, increase their competitors'marginal costs of effort, the players choose their efforts at the second stage of experiment. The more efforts player had exerted the higher probability of winning high prize. In our research, we will focus on sabotage and effort exert in contests with heterogeneous agents. Heterogeneity is modeled via the agents'cost functions, i.e. less able agents have a steeper cost function than more able ones. Let us imagine: Less able agents might feel that their chances of winning the contest is low if they have to compete against majority more able agents in the contest. Would they withdraw their sabotage activity against the more able agents? On the other hand, more able agents might consider the less able agents'chance of winning to be quite low if they are competing against many more able agents in the contest. Thus, would they withdraw their sabotage activities against the less able agents? Weather more able agent sabotage more able agent more in the lower proportion of more able agents contest? If saboteurs'identity is revealed, what impaction on player's activities? We present eight hypotheses in experimental studying: the less able agents quit, superior of the more able agents, most serious candidates for winning the contest, the alliance of the less able agents, battle of the giants, retaliation, revelation of Saboteurs'Identity.We comes to the following conclusion by carrying out six experiments employing 180 paid undergraduate and postgraduate student volunteers.(1) heterogeneity of agents not always destroy their sabotage level and destructive level, it may make competeing more intensive.(2) Effort increases in the sum of the competitors'marginal cost of effort. Effort decreases with the agent's own marginal cost of effort.(3) sabotaged by others discourages subjects more than being discriminated ex ante high effort cost.(4) That agent's behavior is guided by the desire to retaliate if the identity of saboteurs is revealed. (5) In the contest of majority more able agents, the saboteur's identity is revealed can weaken agent's sabotage incentives. In the contest of majority less able agents, the saboteur's identity is revealed can enhance agent's sabotage incentives.In conclusion, for enterprises, a highly competitive environment can induce a higher effort level and higher sabotage level. However, the contest of heterogeneous agents can enhance their competition to obtained more higher output than homogeneous agents contest. Sabotaged by others not only lead to loss of efficiency but also make the effort motivation lost that lead to reduce efforts paying. Creating a fair competitive environment for enterprises is particularly important. Reputation of the agent has implicit incentives. A performance-based compensation plan designed for enterprise should link income and personal prestige. The acts of encouraging and punishing employees can create cooperation atmosphere and fair competition. |
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