The Research Of Executives Shareholding And Firm Value Correlation

The separation of ownership and management of the modern corporation emerge the Principal-agent problem, Company executives incentive problems has been plagued by economists,management and management practitioners. While holding listed companies shares is a right choice, more and more private listed companies choose this kind of incentive mechanism. Domestic scholars have been made much research in the relation executives hold shares and Company performance. the conclusion is not consistent. executive incentive research for private listed companies and Company performance depth is not enough. This article is to supplement and complete the relevant research, also can improve executives private enterprise shareholding status and improve performance provides basis for decision-making. This article is based on the background of the study.1. The Research PurposeThis paper aims to empirical studies reveal the relationship between executive with the company shares and firm value in private listed companies. In reviewing related literatures and executives stock-based incentive theory, the relevant shareholding in combination with the characteristics of private listed companies,We choose 386 private listed companies in 2007 as a sample, using the factor analysis constructed private enterprise value index, and use this index as the dependent variable, respectively by board executives shareholding, managers and supervisors shareholding proportion of senior executives for variables on regression analysis.2,The Research resultsFrom our empirical results, the proportion of shares is quite low, zero shareholding phenomenon exists generally. Three types executives holding shares have different influence for Company performance. board executives and managers shareholding for Company performance existing Convergent effect and benefit of entrenchment effects of defensive alternately, supervisors shareholding promotes enterprise performance. Therefore, the senior management incentive for private listed companies should be treated differently.3,Main contentsChapterâ… , The related theoretical basis and review the literature.This chapter introduces the principal-agent theory, internal shareholding theory, human capital theory, and reviewed and summarized domestic and international research literature.Chapterâ…¡, The private enterprise.This chapter focuses on the development of private enterprises, especially the development of private listed companies in senior management incentive and corporate governance features.Chapterâ…¢, Constructing private enterprise value index.This chapter introduces domestic scholars how to design enterprise performance index system, and the previous research results, with private listed companies own characteristics, to design a system to measure the enterprise value.ChapterIV, The empirical research in Executives shares and enterprise value.This chapter includes:the research hypotheses,sample data, modeling and regression analysis. Mainly divided into three parts to study. Firstly, the research board executives holding with enterprise value relevance; Secondly, managers holding with enterprise value relevance; Thildly, supervisors executives Holding with enterprise value relevance.Chapterâ…¤, conclusions and Suggestions.This chapter introduces the study conclusion and suggestion, and research limitations and future research direction.4,The main contributionsa,Promote private enterprise executives shareholding system and perfecting private enterprise senior management incentive mechanism provides valuable reference.b,Using the factor analysis method to construct private enterprise value index, overcome the scholars in enterprise value simply use Tobin'Q value, ROE index instead.c,To research the relevance of enterprise value and executives holding shares, We divided into three categories:board of executive, supervisors executives and managers. And research the different kinds of executives holding shares and firm value' relation.