The Influences Of Smａll Medium Enterprises Managerial Ownership On Firm Risk Taking

Managerial ownership has always been the focus of the executive excitation mechanism study. This aspect mainly concentrates on the relationship between the managerial ownership and corporate performance. There is little attention paid on the relationship between the managerial ownership and firm risk taking. But now, more and more scholars have realized the importance of this aspect. This paper is mainly to test the relationship between the managerial ownership and firm risk taking, through which to verify the effectiveness of the managerial ownership for dealing with the agency problem and enhancing corporate governance. Based on the literatures at home and abroad, and considering our chinese managerial ownership current situation, this paper proposes the assumptions: the ratio of shareholding market value to fixed wage value has a positive relationship with firm total risk-taking and firm special risk taking, has no correlation with beta; and the proportion of management ownership has non-linear correlation with total firm risk-taking and firm special risk taking, has no correlation with beta. Then the paper constructs regression models about the relationship between management shareholding and firm risk-taking. The paper uses empirical research methods for authentication. The paper has collected the listed companies in the small-and medium-sized enterprises board from 2006 to 2008 as samples for deep analysis of the relationship. Using SPSS software for analysises, we get the results which show that the sample datas have a good consistency with hypothesizes. In this paper, we can know that managerial ownership effects firm risk-taking for the small and medium-sized listed companies. The relationship can be different using different firm risk taking indexes. The study shows that managerial ownership can solve the principal-agent problem effectively in some degree. The results can be benefit for improving corporate performance and provides some useful suggestion. Making the managerial ownership incentive correlative with the firm risk taking can receive better effect.