On The Incentive Mechanism Of The Regulation Subjects In Chinese Real Estate Market

Government plays dual role of"judge"and"athlete"in chinese real estate market. On the one hand, in order to keep the real estate market healthy and orderly, and achieve balanced and orderly use of land resources, the central government formulates a series of policies. On the other hand, government is the main supplier of land. Because real estate market has characters such as monopoly, insufficient information, strong externality and so on. Central government need entrust local governments to implement the regulation of the real estate market, the effort and mode of policy excuted by local governments is critical to the success or failure of central regulation and control policy. However, as an "economic man", the local goverment has different target from the central government, to some degree, under asymmetric informations, "principal-agent" problem between them causes collective non-rational state and that the regulations are not effective in real estate market.When analyzing the regulation issues in real estate market, some studies often overlook the "principal-agent" problem from information asymmetry between makers and implementers of regulation policy. Actually, rational decision behavior among regulation subjects is an interdependent and interrelated game behavior. In the condition of interdependence and interaction, by using the regulation theory, game theory and the "principal-agent" theory, this paper studies the issue of government regulation and designs suitable incentive mechanism.Firstly, this paper combines the regulation history of the primary and secondary real estate market systematically, analyzes the characters and phenomenons presented by regulation subjects in regulatory process, and summarizes the reasons for the unsatisfactory results of government regulation in real estate market. Secondly, For the game relationship between regulation subjects in the real estate market, considering administrative incentives, fiscal incentives and other incentives of the central government, this paper builds a static game model, analyzes the equilibrium between regulation subjects in detail, And compares local government's proceeds and sides game relations under incentives with ones under non-incentives; then build dynamic game model, and study of the impact of the central government's incentive mechanism on local government. Finally, on the basis of "principal-agent" theory and our existing incentives, this paper designs respectively incentive mechanism in complete informati- on and incomplete information on the real estate market. Thereby help central govern- ment standardize local government behavior.