Research On The Risk Control Of The Long Backlog Order On The Model Of Make-to-order

Along with the continuous improvement of the production and living standards, people's demands of the cosumer goods become more and more variable. The demand market also becomes unpredictable. Therefore more and more manufacturing enterprises choose making-to-order instead of stocking production. Making-to-order has flexible demand response.But, it can't avod the long backlog order problems .This is a common problem in the make-to-order enterprises.This paper investigates the problem by the means of principle-agent theory , incentive theory, contract theory, game theory, information economics and theories and methods. Then the paper introduces the principle-agent theory and analyzes the risks in the principle-agent relationship,including commissioning risk and agency risk.Next the paper sets up a game model to discuss the action of the dealers and the manufacturers.And we also set a model to get a best time to performerce oeders. The paper analyzes the internal factors and external causes which bring about long backlog order problems.The paper summarizes sources of risk from six cases and gives six corresponding control strategies.Afterwards an nonlinear principal - agent model is set up to solute the optimal order fulfill time in the premise that the time vilation is allowed.Finally the paper analyzes the uncertain factors from the supply chain view.The paper points that the root cases is the lack of coordination between the relationship after analyzing the problem deeply.The paper trys to use quantity discounts to study the problem under the circumstances that dealers fulfill the oeder in the right time.We get an optimal procurement and manufacturing strategies.Finally the paper points that risk-sharing and benefit-sharing could ruduce the long backlog erder problems and increase effectuveness of supply-chain.