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Not Fully Cooperative Properties Of The Composite Network Countermeasures

Posted on:2011-06-09Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:W W LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2190360308462815Subject:Applied Mathematics
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In this paper, we study network formation games. The main researches are one-way flow and mixed-flow network formation game. B&G function is chosen as the payoff function of the agents. A systematic study on the existence of Nash networks and the characteristics of networks is done for varieties of network formation games, with a situation of non-cooperation, incomplete cooperation and complete cooperation.The basic knowledge and concept of one-way flow network formation game is introduced in Chapter 1. We consider one-way flow network formation game with fixed coalition partition by defining coalition-homogeneous costs. The network is formed by agents playing local movement. The rule of the movement is maximizing the payoff of the whole coalition containing him first. B&G function is chosen as the payoff function of the agents, by which B&G function on coalition-agent is generated. Under the new rule, we will provide the architecture and existence theorem of the local Nash network.In Chapter 2, we study the architecture of strict Nash networks of non-complete cooperative mixed-flow network formation games for the first time. In some networks, the way of information exchange between agents within the same coalition is one-way flow, otherwise, that is two-way flow. In others, he way of information exchange between agents within the same coalition is two-way flow, otherwise, that is one-way flow. The costs of forming links within the coalition are lower as compared to costs of forming links across the coalitions. Agents within the same coalition first form efficient networks, on this basis, we study the architecture of strict Nash networks of mixed-flow models with decay and no decay respectively.In Chapter 3, we study complex network formation games. In these networks, Agents can choose one-way flow and two-way flow. Under the station of some cost, a systematic study on the characteristics of stable networks is done for varieties of network formation games, with a situation of non-cooperation, incomplete cooperation and complete cooperation.
Keywords/Search Tags:network games, mixed-flow, non-complete cooperation, Nash networks
PDF Full Text Request
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