Urban Public Green Building Multi-game Analysis

Public green space is an important component of the urban ecosystems. But the Contradictions between the growth of urbanization level and the lack of public green area are expanding. In the construction of urban public green space, there are game among the central government, the local governments, the citizen, the real estate interests.From the principal-agent perspective, it belongs to a principal-agent model in which agents' efforts are uncertain and agents cannot be supervised. In the principal-agent relationship between the citizen and the government, the reward the government gets from the citizen can not be quantified, however, the government's negative effect is very obvious. This causes the government to choose to provide the urban public green area indolently out of the benefit. In the game of the central government and local governments, because the central government does not grasp the practical efforts of local governments in the construction of urban public green space and the local government's opportunity costs are positive values, the central government can only pay for their compensation based on the results, and the mode of payment should be primarily special transfer payments because the general grant to local government is little incentive.From the analysis of Prisoner's Dilemma, we can know the expected return of supervision of the central government is proportional to the false probability of the local government, and the false probability of the local government is proportional to the cost of supervision of the central government. The game between them is a kind of "Clever Pig Game", whose optimal strategy is that the central government establishes an effective incentive mechanism to urge the local government to implement actively. In the game between citizens, nessler's balance is:(negative, negative), that is, both of them will not participate in the construction and supervision of urban public green space initiatively. In the game of the local government and real estate interests, no matter whether the real estate interests support the supply of urban public green space or not, it depends on the difference of r and C that local governments choose to implement actively or choose to seek rent. When the difference is greater than zero, nessler's balance is:(rent-seeking, not in support).Any public problem derives from system defects. Therefore, this paper further analyses the root of system which causes the game in the construction of urban public green space, namely, the inclination that local governments pursue political achievements makes them neglect the construction of public green space, the imperfectness of local election systems leads to the ignorance to citizens'needs to public green space, and the defects of monitoring mechanism results in serious internal corruption in the government.In view of institutional deficiencies, we propose some feasible policy proposals, for example, establish effective monitoring and control mechanism to prevent the undersupply of public green space, promote the institutionalization of the government's public information disclosure about the construction of public green space, and so on.