| The new rural cooperative medical care system, as a health care system to protect peasantry's health and promote social stability in rural areas, is directly related to the overall development of new rural. It is the important matter of health work in rural areas to establish and perfect the new rural cooperative medical care system, and make rural health care.Modern public goods theory and new institutional economics are integrated used in the research, in which we analyze the evolution process of the new rural cooperative medical care system in Xinmi by adopting institution transformation, discuss its implementation performance from the institutional arrangement, choice and the equilibrium of supply and demand, and delve into the interest relationship between the supply side and the demand side in the new rural cooperative medical care system by adopting Game Theory. On the basis of that, we conceive the frame construction, circulate mode, and suggestions in policy of Xinmi's new rural cooperative medical care scheme, and advance that starting with the two sides of institutional supply and demand, according to the fundamental of properly adjusting peasantry's voluntary participation, improve the rural cooperative health care's ability to plan as a whole, and build the multi-level medical security scheme, so as to constantly accelerate the reconstruction speed of new rural health care organs, and increase the supporting force to rural health care organs and disadvantaged groups. By building a new pattern of the government - market– the third sector trinity supply diversification in new rural cooperative medical care scheme, allowing social resources to actively participate in the new rural cooperative medical care, thereby address the issues imbalance of supply, and the imbalance between efficiency and equity in the new rural cooperative medical care scheme.We mainly find the following conclusions via studies in this dissertation:First of all, in fact, the supply and demand of the new rural cooperative medical scheme is the final outcome of game between the supply side and the demand side. In the new rural cooperative medical system, institutional supply side, related interest groups and the peasantry of institutional demand side make their access to higher average returns through long-term and repeat strategy game in the limited rationality of the decision-making. Secondly, effective supply of the new rural cooperative medical care scheme needs the government and its related sector to fully exert its leading role and use the policy superiority, information superiority, technical superiority and management superiority to actively guide and plan. By building a new pattern of the government - market– the third sector trinity supply diversification in new rural cooperative medical care scheme, the government, the market and the third sector should be in close collaboration, combine their advantages, and ultimately achieve the optimal allocation of resources by reducing transaction costs. Thirdly, from the internal mechanism of the new rural cooperative medical care system, constantly improving Xinmi's rural medical and health system, making efforts to build urban-rural integration health care system, and gradually forward to the medical equity and efficiency of more widespread significance, which are the innovation targets of compensation model, funding model and management model in new rural cooperative medical scheme. Fourthly, the supply system of new rural cooperative medical scheme needs to choose the effective and dynamic supply in different periods and conditions. In addition to structural adjust by means of technical progress, institutional arrangements, change of ownership and other approaches, the new rural cooperative medical care scheme in Xinmi must maintain the relative stability and continuity of its institutions, and preserve the coordination and compatibility of institutional change and relevant supporting structures in the interim adjustment process. |
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