| Recently, controlling shareholders often tunnel listed companies through many kinds of ways. Among them, embezzling funds of listed companies is an outright mean. The expropriation behavior by controlling shareholders has seriously affected the normal operation and financial activities of listed companies, and has become a major problem of the development stock market.Firstly, on the basis of absorption and synthesis the literature, this paper analyzes the research actualities about tunneling behavior, then backdates the theoretical basis of tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders, introduces the reason of tunneling, and analyzes capital occupying behavior by controlling shareholders. In the empirical section, selecting 3514 listed companies during 2003-2006 as research sample, using embezzling funds to measure the extent of tunneling by controlling shareholders, taking multiple linear regression analysis to test the relationship among management environment, ownership arrangement and tunneling by controlling shareholders.The results showed that cash flow right is negatively with the tunneling behavior;the deviation of controlling right and cash flow right is positively related to the tunneling behavior; compared to state-owned companies, the impact of deviation on tunneling behavior is more significant in the no-state-owned companies; management environment has affected the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders,compared to the region with the higher level of the process of marketization, the impact of deviation on tunneling behavior is more significant in the region with the lower level of the process of marketization; compared to the companies with less free cash flow, the impact of deviation on tunneling behavior is more significant in the companies with more free cash flow.Based on the above findings, combined with the actual situation of our country, this paper presents suggestions in order to complete the inside and outside mechanism of corporate governance. |
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