The Empirical Study Of Marketization Ownership Structure And Earnings Management Of Listed Companies

Earnings management is is an important field of modern research of accounting. In the accounting academy field abroad,earnings management have been studied for 20 years.In China, earnings management is a new problem of coming with the stocket market.In recently years,the phenomemon of listed company use earnings management to disclose the false information is common, the list company's earnings management have seriously affected the investor's confidence and the capital market's healthy development, and have brought the society's attention. Earnings management is not only an accounting behaviour,but an manage behaviour,it is the result of conflicts of interest of all sides in the principao-agent.Corporate governance is an arrange of system to solve the relation of interest in all sides of principal-agent,is an system reason of earnings management.The article have standed at the point of view of external company governance and the internal of company governance and at the base of Western's article and researched the affect of external marketization,the government interment and the effective of law and the internal extremely holder and other lagre share holder,and at the same time have researched the external and internal govern system how to combine and attect the earnings management. The article have choosed the company data sample of 2002-2007 which is listed at shanghai and Shenzhen, used the methord of describe,means comparison,multianalysis to analyse the internal large share holder and the external governance environment how to affect the earnings management. The result is:(1)The first holder and earnings management have the positive correlations, the balance of other share holders can't exert the use of balance, the bigger of balance of other share holders, the earnings management are bigger; the executive holder's cash flow right and the earnings management have the negative correlations, the deviate of executive holder's cash flow right and the control right and the earnings management have the positive correlations; when the executive's control right have reached the absolutely control, the positive correlation of balance of other share holders, first holder and the earnings management is more.(2) When the executive holder is state owner,the earnings management are smaller.(3) The law index,marketization index and the earnings management have the positive correlations.(4) The first holder,balance of others share holder and earnings management have more obviously positive correlations in the sample of good governance environment. Conclusions from this study we can see that the ownership structure needs to be further optimized, for example, to reduce the proportion of the largest shareholding, as the state-controlled listed companies is indeed able to control the phenomenon of earnings management, it should support the state-controlled listed companies; strictly control the ultimate control of cash flow rights and control over the degree of separation, rather than just use of other major shareholders of the check as the share of checks and balances and can not play the role of earnings management control, but to some extent, increase the earnings management. Shareholders as a result of surplus management is a substitute for inadequate protection.