Research On The Impact Of External Corporate Governance Constraints On Executives’ Corruptions

With the rapid development of economy in our country,the corruption level of corporateexecutive corruption also show a growing trend,making negative influence to enterprises andeconomic development, and has caused the wide attention of the society.How to make use ofcorporate governance mechanisms to restraint executives behaviors and reduce the possibility ofcorruption,has become the focus of many scholars’ researches. As one of the two paths ofcorporate governance,external governance mechanism plays a very important role in corporatemanagement,especially in the case of internal governance mechanism may be failure. Whilemost relevant studies focused on the influence of company’s internal governance on corruption,less researches consider about the external governance mechanism. Therefore, this article try toanalyze from the perspective of external governance constraints,research the influence ofexternal governance on corporate executive corruption,and discusses how to improve executivecorruption problem of our country effectively.Based on the analysis of the current situation of our country corporate executivecorruption,and combining the theory of corporate governance and related corruptionresearch,this article use the listed companies which had appeared executive corruption caseduring2004-2013as samples,and make use of many methods to make empirical analysis of theeffect of external governance factors on executive corruption,such as logistic regression, themean test,and so on.The results show that:(1) the debt have a obvious constrained influence on corporateexecutives’ corrupt behaviors.The ratio of short-term debt in corporate debt is higher, and thedebt scale is greater,the effect of reducing executive corruption incidence is more effective;(2)there is a significant negative correlation relationship between competition from product marketand executive corruption,which shows that the pressure from competition in product market caneffectively restrain executives corruption;(3) since the competition from managers market have afailure performance to state-owned enterprises,it do not have a significant restrain on executivecorruption.And differ from the state-owned enterprises,competition of managers market hasshown an effective constraint influence on reducing the corrupt behaviors of corporateexecutives;(4) in terms of restricting executives’ corruption, legal environment did not show theexpected governance effect. The efficiency of legal environment on corporate governance inChina is yet to be promoted.