"the Relationship Between The New State-owned Enterprises' Corporate Governance Structure And Corporate Performance Study

The reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is carried on step by step with the building of the social market economic system in China, which get the great achievements in solving low efficiency, improving competition, maintaining state asset and expanding the national economy. At the same time, a lot of "Neo-SOEs" appear with the "China character" in the cause of the reform, and they become the phased phenomenon .Because of their complex and variable characters, the research about "Neo-SOEs" only contain their definition, nature, characteristic, industry distributing, economic efficiency and so on in present reference. "Neo-SOEs" are distinctively different with the traditional SOEs is that they exist in competitive market and have modern property right and corporate management system. Their rapid development show that they have strong competitive capacity,while "Neo-SOEs" still face the corporate governance problems for separation of ownership and control. So it is importance to study the relationship between corporate governance and performance from corporate governance. The research results would increase SOE governance efficiency and strengthen their competitive capacity.On the base of the corporate governance and agent theory, State controlled listed companies (SCLC) in "Neo-SOEs" become the study objects which in the 9 competitive industries. 159 SCLC, 477 samples data from 2003 to 2005 year was selected. Through descriptive statistics, relevant analysis, compare means as well as simple and double factor interaction multiple regression, the empirical research was testified the correlativity between the shareholding structure (shareholding concentration degree, shareholding constitution), board of directors, (board of directors scale, independent directors proportion, the duality leadership structure) the board of supervisors (board of supervisors scale), the managerial incentive (manager annual income and holding shares quantity proportion in total) and the corporate performance (ROE and ROA) respectively.Analysis on the shareholding structure of SCLC shows that the shareholding concentration is higher, the corporate performance is better. The state shares (FST) is positively related with the performance; the legal person shares (FLP) has no significant relationship with the performance, and the tradable A shares (FTA) is negatively related with the performance. The relationship between the directors and the performance is testified that the scale of the board of the directors has a U-shaped relationship with the performance; the independent director proportion and the board of supervisors scale do not affect the corporate performance, but the duality leadership structure is positively related with the performance. The effect of managerial incentive on the corporate performance shows that the manager annual income including the internal directors, the supervisors and the managers' has significant positive effect on the corporate performance except the independence directors. Only in SCLC with the high...