Property Rights Reform Of State-owned Enterprises, Standardize The Way

During my graduate studies, I feel fortunately to join in a project which was in the charge of my tutor Prof. Wu Yue about the reform of SOEs. Through the project, I get many opportunities to get in touch with SOEs and CSASAC, which makes me quite acquainted with the importance of the SOEs as well as the existing problems among the running of them. In view of the significant status of SOEs along with the arduousness and complicacy of its reform, I think giving deep research on some relative issues of SOEs will have a strong practical value in a long time. The government wants to find out methods how to solve the difficulties of SOEs, naturally, our legal research should services for it. That's why I choose SOE as my essay subject. The dispute between Lang Xianping and Gu Chujun in 2004 initiated an extensive discussion about the phenomenon of state-owned capital loss in the Property Rights Reform of SOEs. So far it still hasn't formed a final conclusion. In this sense, it still worthies researching. Therefore, under my tutor's guidance I further narrowed the research scope and fixed the title: Guarantees of Property Rights Reform of SOEs—procedural justice, restraint on powers and rule of law.ChapterⅠoutlines the theory of property reform of SOEs. Above all, it's necessary to give a clear definition to the concept-property right, for it is the foundation of our follow-up research. So in this part, on the basis of comparing couples of mainstream viewpoints in the theory circle, the author makes a new definition of this concept and expounds the basis functions of property right in order to answer why we should put forward the reform. In the end, the author gives a simple review of the course of property reform of SOEs.ChapterⅡanalyses the relationship between state-owned capital loss and property right reform. First, the author introduces the illegitimate measures in the reform from several famous cases and affirms that state-owned capital loss in property rights reform is an objective fact. Second, the author demonstrates the correctness in the direction of the property rights reform from two aspects, one is the existence that property right reform is not the only area state-owned capital loss lies in, the other is the remarkable achievements that property reform has obtained. Third, the conclusion is formed: nowadays, it is not a question of whether to reform or not, but how to reform.ChapterⅢcovers the crux that lies in the property reform. In this part, the economic theory of efficiency and impartiality is brought in. The author holds that our government should allocate the proportion between the above two points according to the practical conditions. However one problem in reform is that our current governmental orientation neither accord with the present situation, nor conform to the popular will. So while we adhere to the principle of preferred efficiency, we should also lay special emphasis on impartiality. Besides, many scholars and officials attribute the problems in the reform to imperfect legal systems, in fact, we have many law and further more some of them has great feasibility, however, it seems difficult to bring their function into full play. To sum up, something is wrong with the execution.ChapterⅣis about the choice of the ways of reform. Through the above analysis and demonstration the author eventually chooses the following way-advancing reform impartiality by procedural justice, realising reform under role of law by the check ofpower. To say it in detail, they contain the following aspects: laying restrictions on the property right reform of public SOEs to secure the basic social equity; designing transparent and open reform exchange procedures to secure its formal equity; giving fine play to the systems of entrance transaction and price contest to come to a reasonable pricing of state-owned capital, so as eventually to secure the substantial equity of the reform; taking such measures as improving the responsibility system, constructing supervisory system and bringing in public-interest litigation to restrain the administrative power and change the circumstances of its abuse during the reform so as eventually to secure the objects of the reform.