Correlation Analysis Of Ownership Structure And Corporate Performance Of Listed Companies In China

The common equity structure is the core problem of the corporate governance. Areasonable common equity structure plays an active role in the efficiency of the corporategovernance. Therefore, a reasonable common equity structure should be set up when wedesign the corporate governance. In China, most of the listed companies came fromrestructured state-owned enterprises. Then, what on earth is the relevant relationshipbetween common equity structure of the Chinese listed corporate and their performance?The paper tries to answer this question by means of empirical analysis.Eighty estate listed companies, which listed in Shanghai Securities Exchange andShenzhen Securities Exchange before 2004, are used as researching samples and theirannounced data of 2004,2005 and 2006 are chosen to research the relationship betweencommon equity structure of the listed corporate and their performance. The result shows:(1) Generally speaking, the common equity of the listed companies, which aresymbolized as the estate listed corporate, is very scattering. However, although thefraction of shares the largest shareholder holds is not too much, he owns rather emergecontrolling ability in the aspects of the corporate governance and decisions.(2) In the inner governance of our listed companies, state-owned shares performpoorly, have a low efficiency and don't play their expected function. At the same time,state-owned shares aren't given full play to its advantages. However, non-state-ownedshares, especially exchange-traded shares, show their positive function to the corporateperformance in the corporate governance.(3) The equity-controlling style is made to bring about obviously different influenceto corporate performance by the function different share-holders play in the corporategovernance. It demonstrates that the managing performance of the share-diversified listedcompanies, which the non-state-owned share-holders control, is prior to that of thestate-owned firms. In addition, the influence that share-holders' structure acts towardcorporate performance is deeper than share-holders' style does.