Listed Companies Of China's Information Industry Is Over-investment Behavior And Ownership Structure Of The Relationship Between Empirical Analysis

In the finance management of listed companies, investment decision, the main cause for corporation development, the crucial basis for future cash-flow increase and the foundation for finance decision-making, influences the management risk, profit development prospect. Enterprise's investment decision does not always maximize it sown value owing to the complexity of decision-making process and the multiplicity of influencing factors. Accordingly, over-investment is generated ,badly damaging company's value and hinders company's development. The stockholder's rights structure is the foundation of corporate governance research. In the company value creation process, the stockholder's rights structure first affects the company's the investment, and then affects the company's value.This dissertation is organized as follows. At first, this dissertation reviews corporate governance theory, economic utility theory and enterprise investment theory from the angle of investment decision process to establish theoretical basis for analysis of over-investment's motive. Then according to the researches on over-investment by scholars home and abroad, this dissertation defines over-investment as an ineffective decision behavior accepting the non-optimal investment opportunity in terms of company's value, especially the program of NPV<0, and resulting in the decrease of fund allocation efficiency. This dissertation analyzes the possibilities of over-investment's motive. The result is that the over-investment's motive of Information Technology Company belongs to private benefit motive controlled by administrators. On the base of this result, this dissertation also regression analysis is applied to relationship between the stockholder's rights structure and investment of Technology Company. This dissertation draws the conclusion: under the control of administrators, the Increasing of the stock holed by administrators can't help increase the value of the Information Technology Companies, On the contrary, through holing the stocks of company administrators can control companies more closely, and the over-investment behavior become more serious; the Information Technology Companies' Law annual bonus shareholder . State-owned stock shareholder and Centralism degree don't play the Positive role. Only the Circulation stock shareholder have some positive influence to the over-investment by Massively selling the stocks of company. At last, this dissertation advances some suggestions and strategies for governing leading companies' over-investment in light of the above research achievements and Chinese current economic policies.