Based On Game Theory Perspective Of Sino-us Energy Interests

The reserve of natural energy of both China and U.S. are limited. They depend on the supply of the global energy market. During these two countries'persuit of energy interests, conflicts and cooperation appeal at the same time. The appliance of coordination game theory could predict Sino-US energy interest relations as well as actions. The model of coordination game theory could erase the doubt that whether the competition among two import countries will turn into conflict.From the perspective of coordination game theory of Sino-US energy interest, the strategies of two countries are of the same. (cooperation, cooperation), (conflict, conflict) are two profiles of Nash equilibria. In the game of Sino-US energy interest, the choice of cooperation is the most reasonable focal point. Cooperation strategy could reach the payoff dominant equilibrium and get the maxism payoffs. Yet, the risk dominance could not be totally ruled out if the uncertainty of two countries'behaviors. In order to avoid the risk dominant equilibria, cheap talk is introduced by many foreign scholars using experimental methods. Thus, before the beginning of Sino-US energy interest coordination game, two players can bring cheap talk in and reduce untrust and uncertainty to make sure both countries choose the strategy of cooperation.The model of sino-us energy interest coordination games has been proved from cases of series of dialogue between two players and of Unocal bid. There are also many spaces for cooperation in energy pollution control, energy efficiency increasing, clean energy research ect. China and US must deepen the dialogue and keep cheap talk in the platform of Sino-US dialogue, before coordination games begin. Strategy uncertainties would be reduced after cheap talk and the game would reach Pareto Optimality by both players choosing cooperation.