| Fundamental issues of deposit insurance are being debated in the United States and abroad. In the United States, the debate was stimulated by the upsurge in bank failures in the 1980s and dissatisfaction with the record of depository institution regulation during that period. In the end of last century, the deposit insurance institution of US, FDIC, held a roundtable conference to thoroughly discuss further reforms. Basing on the comments delivered by experts during the conference and other related researches on FDIC reforms, the author writes down this dissertation in order to offer some policy suggestions to our banking regulatory institution.There're many ways to discuss the deposit insurance reform concerning the moral hazard. Firstly, we could assess the issue in a macro or a micro way. As we review the core concept of deposit insurance, we could recognize that its essential goal is to effectively separate and constrain the bank-run risk, while ensuring the smooth function of payment system during financial turmoil. The hidden premise is that excessive protection on any individual bank will leads to a weak banking system. In practice, due to many unwanted factors, such as interests group lobbying, voting effects, the purpose of deposit insurance deviates to a universal protection on all banks and depositors, which inevitably creates a fault stimulating system. Thus, to reform deposit insurance system, we should first correctly define deposit insurance, and eliminate the consequent moral hazard basing on the definition. In a micro way, we should ensure that we have set up an appropriate stimulating structure in the deposit insurance system and encourage the supervisor, owner of banks and depositors to input decent portion of their resources to monitor the bank risk and realize the optimized risk match. This is what the dissertation endeavors to accomplish.Another criterion is to assess the reform plans according to the principles of efficiency and equity. The efficiency criterion is to compare the cost of the existing reform proposals and apply the one with less cost. While the equity standard is to seek the balanced point of interests groups concerned, in case we might abate the loss of one party on the cost of increasing that of another.Since deposit reform involves complex issues, most of the current proposals lack a comprehensive system to consolidate the different views. Being aware of the common deficiency, the author tries to unite the plans under the guide of moral hazard constraint. He surveys and analyzes specific proposals to reform deposit insurance, grouping them according to whether they increase depositors' risk, increase bank owners' costs, rely on increased use of market mechanisms to ensure prompt regulatory action, or restrict the range of banking activity financed by insured deposits. He also analyzes the fundamental issues of deposit insurance system of China, and offers some policy suggestions.Even though deposit insurance reform is an academic cliche, there still exist many fallacies or deficiencies in the current researches in China: a) references are out-dated, most of them lingering on the old issues of reform in the 1980s; b) lack of thematic research, many are introductory articles; c) no operational reform plans, most remain to be an ivory-tower discourse; d) no comprehensive reform comments. The author refers to large amount of original English documents, most written in the end of 1990s, introduces and comments on applicable reform plans and tries to avoids the above problems.The following is the brief content of the dissertation.The first chapter of the article examines the history of the deposit insurance system of United States. The rest of the part focuses on the basic structure and function of the deposit insurance and discusses some current issues on the deposit insurance system reform.The second chapter defines the basic context of moral hazard issue and its inherent characteristic originated from the deposit insurance system. To further his view... |
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