Analysis Of The Causes Of China's Urban Unemployment

Unemployment (or lay-off) is the inevitable outcome of the economic and social development, and the new issue after the China's market-economy reform. Unemployment has not only resulted in the great waste of human resources, but also imposed the instability on the families and society. Therefore, it is urgent to study and harness the unemployment. With the research upon the domestic and foreign unemployment, the thesis aims to calculate the China's urban unemployment rate, explain the causes and put forward some countermeasures and suggestions. This thesis is composed of five chapters (four aspects of contents).1, The definition, format and calculation of the China's urban unemployment (chapter 2).2, The cause analysis on China's urban unemployment (chapter 3).3, The game analysis on the China's urban unemployment (chapter 4).4, The countermeasures and suggestions to harness the unemployment (chapter 5). Chapter 3 and 4 are the stressing parts in this thesis.At present, China's urban unemployment can be approached from two sides of aggregate quantity and structure. In terms of the aggregate quantity, the unemployment, created by the labor demand's mismatch with the labor supply, is called the unemployment of the aggregate quantity contradiction. There are four reasons for this kind of unemployment, the decline of economic growth rate; the industrial structure adjustment; the State-owned-enterprise (SOE) system transformation and increasing labor cost. In terms of structure, the unemployment, created by the disequilibrium between the labor demand and supply, is called the unemployment of the structure disequilibrium. There are three reasons for this kind of unemployment, the poor labor quality, the blocked mobility of work force and the invariable employment opinion.The author attempts to apply the game theory to interpreting the China's urban unemployment causes. Suppose that the SOEs' managers, the SOEs' employees, the private enterprisers all chase the profit maximization. They are rational economicindividuals with risk-neutral attitude and don't know their rivals' action before making strategies (the simultaneous action). So the unemployment can be analyzed by the means of the non-coorperative complete information static game. The game model contains two parts, one between the SOEs' managers and the SOEs' employees, and the other between the lay-offs and private enterprisers. The model respectively explains the lay-offs formation and reasons why it is difficult for those lay-offs to find new jobs. The result of the game model is unanimous to its counterpart in chapter 3.In regard to the analysis on the causes of China's urban unemployment, this thesis reckons that the target to cope with the unemployment is to develop the brain labor-intensive industry in the long run. In the short-term, it is critical to find how to overcome or minimize the aggregate quantity contradiction and structure disequilibrium of the labor demand and supply, in order to harness the China's urban unemployment.